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APPEAL AND ERROR-REIARKS OF PROSEUTIN0 AuroRNEY-PnJu-
DICiAL ERRoR.-The defendant was found guilty of soliciting striking
railroad shopmen to commit acts of violence. Counsel appealed on the
ground, inter alia, that the argument of the prosecuting attorney was
unfair in referring to the accused as a traitor and slacker, in implying
that there were additional, absent witnesses against him, and in re-
ferring to a case of bombing a bank, with the implication that a similar
situation was intended to result from the alleged speech of the accused.
Held, (one judge dissenting) that the judgment be reversed. The dissent-
ing opinion took the position that though the accused may not have had a
"fair trial" this was not a cause for reversal. State v. Schleifer (1925)
102 Conn. 708.
American jurists have vigorously advocated a reduction in the number
of reversals in order to minimize the uncertainty and delays of justice, and
to create a greater respect for law. Taft, The Delays of the Law (1903)
18 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 23; Amidon, The Quest for Error and the Doing of
Justice (1906) 40 Am. L. REv. 681; Baldwin, The Artificiality of our Lazo
of Evidence (1911) 21 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 105. In fact, the abolition of
the privilege of appeal has been recently suggested. Works, Juridcal
Reform (1919) 85. Another suggestion has been to limit the appeal from
conviction in criminal cases to three situations: (1) where the evidence
does not establish the crime prima facie; (2) where material evidence
offered by the defendant has been improperly excluded; (3) where the trial
judge reserves questions of law which he considers doubtful and of impor-
tance. Smyth, The Limitation of the Right of Appeal in Crimizal Caeca
(1904) 17 HARv. L. REv. 317. In the early cases there could be no reversal
unless it appeared "that the truth had thereby not been reached". 1 Wig-
more, Evidence (1904) sec. 21; Horford v. Wilson (1307, C. P.) 1 Taunt. 12.
But this was ignored in a decision of the exchequer holding that an error
of ruling per se gave the excepting and defeated party a right to a new
trial even though the verdict seemed proper. Crease v. Barrett (1835) 4 L.
J. Exch. 297; 1 Wigmore, op. cit. sec. 21. This "Exchequer Rule" has been
applied in many American courts. Commonwealth v. White (1894) 162
Mass. 403, 38 N. E. 707; Lockett v. State (1918) 136 Ark. 473, 207 S. W.
55; Garner, Texas Criminal Justice Again (1911) 2 JouR. AM. INST. CRInT.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 339. This rule, however, has been abandoned by statute
in England for both civil and criminal cases, restoring the original doctrine.
Similar legislation has been adopted to govern federal and most state courto.
Wheeler, Procedural Reform in the Federal Courts (1917) 60 U. PA. L. REV.
1; COmENTS (1924) 22 MIcn. L. REv. 591. But the narrow interpre-
tation given our statutes results in a greater proportion of reversAs
than in England. 1 Wigmore, op. cit.. sec. 21. Applying the pro-
vailing rule to the instant ease, the misconduct of a prosecutinZ attorney
should be a ground for reversal only where, upon the whole record, it ap-
pears that there has been a miscarriage of justice. People v. Steiart
(1910) 163 Mlich. 1, 127 N. W. 816; People v. Werncr (1923) 225 Michi. 18,
195 N. W. 697; cf. State -v. Barrington (1906) 193 Mo. 23, 95 S. W. 235.
Since the real question is that of prejudice to the accused, the statement of
the dissent, that denial of a "fair trial" is not a cause for reversal, was
altogether too broad. For reversals upon similar grounds see State V. Fcr-
rnne (1921) 96 Conn. 160, 113 Atl. 452; State v. Ferronc (1922) 97 Conn.
258, 116 Ati. 336; State v. Luri (1923) 100 Conn. 207, 123 Atl. 378; Figh
v. United States (1914, C. C. A. 1st) 215 Fed. 544.
(105)
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ARDITRATION AND AWARD-WITHDRAWAL OF ONE OF ARBITRATORS--FAIL-
URE To APPOINT A SUBSTITUTE ARBITRATOR AS PROVIDED IN AGREEMENT.-
An arbitration agreement provided that in the event one of the three named
arbitrators ceased to act before an award was made, the, remaining arbi-
trators were to appoint a substitute for him. On the evening before the
award was to be made one of the arbitrators resigned. The remaining two
concurred in a decision, and made an award thereon without appointing a
third arbitrator. The award was vacated in the Appellate Division. The
plaintiff appealed. Held, the award was valid because the withdrawal of
the arbitrator, after listening to all the evidence, was equivalent to no more
than a dissent. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co. v. New Jersey Ins. Co.
(1925) 240 N. Y. 398, 148 N. E. 562.
At common law it was essential to the validity of an award that all the
arbitrators concur. Byard v. Harkrider (1886) 108 Ind. 376, 9 N. E. 294;
Whitman v. Bartlett (1908) 156 Ala. 546, 46 So. 972. In some instances
statutes expressly provide that a majority award shall be binding. Steph-
ens v. Hopper (1860) 31 Ga. 589; Washburn v. White (1908) 197 Mass.
540, 84 N. E. 106. Even where such a statute exists, the courts hold that
there must be a participation by all the arbitrators in consulting and
deliberating upon the award to be made. Doherty v. Doherty (1889) 148
Mass. 367, 19 N. E. 352; Morse, Arbitration and Award (1872) 151. In the
absence of a provision for the appointment of a substitute arbitrator, it has
been held that a refusal on the part of one of the arbitrators to participate
in the making of the award did not prevent the majority from rendering an
award, where a majority award has been authorized, for otherwise it would
put into the hands of one arbitrator the power to defeat the arbitration.
Maynard v. Frederick (1851, Mass.) 7 Gush. 247; Witz v. Tregallas (1896)
82 Md. 351, 33 Atl. 718; Dodge v. Brennan (1879) 59 N. H. 138. Where,
however, the arbitration agreement provided for a substitute arbitrator
and an arbitrator ceased to act before a hearing was had on the questions
involved, it was held necessary to appoint a substitute arbitrator. Bullard
v. Grace (1925) 240 N. Y. 388, 148 N. E. 559. In the instant case, the
court by adopting a liberal construction of the arbitration agreement held,
that despite the provision of the arbitration agreement, the appointment
of a substitute arbitrator was unnecessary. Since the majority had
already concurred, it would probably have been futile to have appointed a
substitute arbitrator and it would have entailed a rehearing of the whole
case with its attendant expense and loss of time. The parties obviously
intended to be bound by a majority award, and hence there should be no
cause for grievance when a majority of the original arbitrators concurred
therein. Cf. Cooley v. Dill (1851, Tenn.) 1 Swan. 313. It is problematical
how far other courts will accept a doctrine which treats the resig-
nation of one arbitrator after all the hearings have been had as a dissent,
and which adopts the theory that a substitute arbitrator would have no
appreciable influence in the arguments and deliberations leading to the
award.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS--MAY A BAR Asso-
CIATION APPEAL?-By leave of court, a bar association filed an in-
formation seeking to disbar the respondent. A commissioner found the
attorney guilty, and exceptions by both parties to the recommendation of
suspension were overruled. The Bar Association then excepted. Hold,
that the exceptions be sustained and the attorney be disbarred. Peoplo cx
rel. Chicago Bar Assoc. v. Hoering (1925, Ill.) 148 N. E. 299.
The court apparently takes for granted that the Bar Association was
entitled to appeal. But almost universally a bar association is held to have
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no right that the lower court act on its petition, and no control over the
proceeding. In re Peck (1914) 88 Conn. 447, 91 Atl. 274; BostonL Bar
Assoc. v. Casey (1912) 211 Mass. 187, 97 N. E. 751. And hence is not en-
titled to appeal. In re Thompson (1896) 5 Cal. Unrep. Cas. 414, 45 Pac.
1034; Critchfield v. Levy (1919, Pa.) 109 Atl. 155; (1925) 34 Y,%L Lw
JOURNAL, 906.
BANKRUPTCY-PRIORITY-CONSTRUCTION OF BANKRUPTCY Acr.-Debts due
the United States were proved in bankruptcy proceedings. The United
States asserted priority under U. S. Rev. Sts. 1878, see. 346G, which grants
the United States priority on all debts, and under the Bankruptcy Act of
July 1, 1898 (30 Stat. at L. 544, 563) ch. 541, see. 64 (b) 5, which grants
priority to "debts owing any person who by the laws of the States or the
United States is entitled to priority". The Circuit Court of Appealz held
that the United States has no priority on the grounds that the United States
was not ex-pressly mentioned under see. 64 (b) 5. Held, that the judgment
be affirmed. Davis, Fed. Agent, v. Pringle (1925, U. S.) 45 Sup. Ct. 549.
This case is contra to lower Federal Court decisions which have generally
held that "person" under sec. 64 (b) 5 includes the States and the United
States. In re Westernt Inplement Co. (1909, C. C. A. 8th) 171 Fed. 81;
In re Atlantic, G. & P. S. S. Co. (1923, D. C., Md.) 289 Fed. 145; In re
Tidewater Coal Exchange Co. (1922, C. C. A. 2d) 280 Fed. 648; NOTES
(1924) 97 CENT. L. Joui. 139. In the Supreme Court, however, Chief
Justice Taft and Justices Van Devanter and Clarke in a dissent to Sloan
Shipyards v. United States Flect Corp. (1922) 258 U. S. 549, 574, 42 Sup.
Ct. 386, 389, maintained that the United States has no priority, the majority
of the court, however, deciding the case on other grounds. Nevertheless
this construction of sec. 64 (b) 5 seems sound, inasmuch as the United
States was expressly mentioned under (a) of see. 64, dealing with taxes,
but was not specifically included under (b) 5 of see. 64, regarding debts in
general.
BROKERS-WHEN ComIIssIoN is DuE ON A SALE "TO Airt-tv".-The de-
fendant authorized the plaintiff, a commercial broker in New Yorkr, to
negotiate the sale in this country of 2500 tons of Brazilian ore to be shipped
from Rio de Janeiro. The plaintiff obtained a purchaser and prepared a
contract containing the clause, "sailer lost, contract void". The contract
was accepted and signed by both parties. The vessel and cargo were lost
during passage. The lower court found for the plaintiff. Held, that the
judgment be reversed, that the plaintiff was not entitled to a commission, as
the sale had become a nullity. Charles Hardy & Ruperti, Inc. -. N ezs,
Hesslein & Co. (1925, 1st Dept.) 211 App. Div. 697.
A broker is not ordinarily entitled to any recompense upon a quantum
meruit basis. Barrett v. Johnson (1870) 64 Pa. 223; Zeincr v. Antisell
(1889) 75 Calif. 509, 17 Pac. 642. For he has very few of the functions
of an agent, and is more like a person working for a reward. Mechem,
Outlines of Agencies (3d ed. 1923) sec. 647. But in the absence of unusual
circumstances a broker is entitled to a commission when he has obtained
a person ready and willing to buy on terms satisfactory to the vendor.
Kalley v. Baker (1891) 132 N. Y. 1, 29 N. E. 1091; Nagi v. Small (1912)
159 Iowa, 387, 138 N. W. 849; Ingalls v. Smith (1915) 93 Kan. 814, 145
Pac. 846; contra: Richards v. Jackson (1869) 31 Md. 250 (vendee must first
complete the purchase). For a broker does not warrant that the purchaser
who has been accepted by the principal will perform. Gelatt -. Ridge
(1893) 117 Mo. 553, 23 S. W. 882; Gunn v. Bank of Californi7a (1893) 99
Calif. 349, 33 Pac. 1105. But where a purchaser merely enters into an
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option contract, a broker is not entitled to a commission unless the pur-
chase is completed. Lawrence v. Rhodes (1900) 188 Ill. 96, 58 N. E. 910;
Christensen v. Duborg (1915) 38 Nev. 404, 150 Pac. 306. Many courts
have reached the same decision regarding contracts where performanco is
dependent on the happening of a condition precedent, seemingly on the
analogy of option contracts. Kost v. Reilly (1892) 6 Conn. 57, 24 Atl.
519 (contract for sale of saloon conditional on license being granted);
Aigler v. Carpenter Place Land Co. (1893) 51 Kan. 718, 33 Pac. 593 (con-
tract for sale of land with provision that vendee forfeit initial payment in
case of failure to perform); Merritt v. Lillyblade (1910) 57 Wash. 159, 106
Pac. 621 (contract for sale of hotel leasehold conditional on landlord's
assent to an assignment); contra: Carnes v. Howard (1902) 180 Mass.
569, 63 N. E. 122 (contract for sale of land conditional on obtaining per-
mission from probate court to convey). The correct view is that a broker
is entitled to his commission when he has rendered the service for which
he was retained, even though not beneficial to the vendor. Paulson v. Dal-
lett (1867, N. Y.) 2 Daly, 40 (facts identical with those of the instant case);
Gibson v. Gray (1897) 17 Tex. Civ. App. 646, 43 S. W. 922; Payne v. Pon-
der (1913) 139 Ga. 283, 77 S. E. 32. What constitutes performance of his
undertaking will vary according to the terms of his employment and the
customs prevailing in his particular form of brokerage. Rutenbery IV.
Main (1874) 47 Calif. 213; Munroe v. Taylor (1906) 191 Mass. 483, 78 N.
E. 106. It would seem on the facts of the instant case that the
plaintiff should have recovered, for it appears that he was employed on the
customary terms and a "no arrival, no sale" contract is a common one in
maritime transactions.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOm OF SPEECH AND PRESS-CRIMINAL AN-
ARcHY.-"The Revolutionary Age" published an article advocating a "po-
litical mass strike" to overthrow government and to substitute for it "the
dictatorship of the proletariat". The defendant, its business manager and
part-owner, was convicted under a New York statute which defined and
made the advocacy of criminal anarchy a felony. The conviction was af-
firmed in the New York Court of Appeals, and the defendant appealed to
the United States Supreme Court, claiming that the statute as applied
violated the "due process" clause. Held, (Justices Holmes and Brandeis
dissenting) that the conviction be affirmed. Gitlow v. New York (1925) 45
Sup. Ct. 625.
In early cases under the federal Espionage Act, the Supreme Court hold
that Congress could punish utterances only when of such a nature and
when made under such circumstances as would create a "clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has
a right to prevent". See Mr. Justice Holmes' opinion in Schenck v. United
States (1919) 249 U. S. 47, 52, 39 Sup. Ct. 247, 249; of. Frohwcrk V.
United States (1919) 249 U. S. 204, 39 Sup. Ct. 249; Debs v. United States
(1919) 249 U. S. 211, 39 Sup. Ct 252. In subsequent cases, however, the
majority of the court, while not specifically overruling this test, has ignored
it, holding, in effect, that words having a tendency to produce evil may be
punished. Abrams v. United States (1919) 250 U. S. 616, 40 Sup. Ct. 17;
COMMENTS (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 337; Chafee, A Contemporary
State Trial (1920) 33 HARv. L. REV. 747; Schaefer v. United State. (1920)
251 U. S. 466, 40 Sup. Ct. 259; Pierce v. United States (1920) 252 U. S.
239, 40 Sup. Ct. 205. Justices Holmes and Brandeis have consistently ad-
vocated the rule of the Schenck case, supra. The same difference of opin-
ion appears in the instant case, for the cases involving the federal Espion-
age Act and those involving state sedition statutes present essentially the
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same free speech problem. Cf. Gilbert v. State (1920) 254 U. S. 325, 41
Sup. Ct. 125; COMMuENTS (1921) 30 YALE LAW JounNAL, 623. The instant
decision limits the "clear and present danger" test, holding that it does not
apply, as was implied in the Schenck case, to statutes e.xpressly prohibiting
language of a specific character. Thus the pronounced tendency of the
majority of the Supreme Court to support the policy of strict reprezsion
is shown. For a discussion of the case in the New York courts, see (1921)
30 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 861; COMMENTS (1922) 32 ibid. 178; Noi3 t1922)
36 HARv. L. REV. 199.
CONsTITUTIONAL LAW-INC0mE TAx ON SALARIEs oF FEDERAL Junr.z.-
The plaintiff, having been appointed a judge of the Court of Claims on
September 1st, 1919, sued for sums paid by him under protest in 1919 and
1920. Revenue Act, 1918, (40 Stat. at L. 1065) contains a provision
which would include his salary as judge in his taxable income. The
lower court overruled the defendant's demurrer. Held, (Justice Brandeis
dissenting) that the judgment be affirmed since the provision violated Art.
III, sec. 1 of the Constitution of the United States which prohibits CongreZs
from diminishing a judge's compensation during his continuance in office.
Miles v. Graham (1925, U. S.) 45 Sup. Ct. 601.
The provision in sec. 213 of the Revenue Act taxing the salary of a
Federal judge has been held to violate Art. m. see. 1, where the appoint-
ment preceded the passing of the statute. Evans v. Gore (1920) 213 U. S.
245, 40 Sup. Ct. 550 (Justices Holmes and Brandeis disscnting). The de-
cision has been much criticized, since the independence of the judiciary,
aimed at by the framers of the constitution, does not seem to be threatened
by taxing the salaries of judges as provided in this statute. See (1920)
30 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 75; (1920) 14 Am. POL. SC. REV. 635; (1920) 20
COL. L. REv. 794; (1920) 34 HARv. L. REV. 70; (1920) 7 VA. L. REV. 69.
The present decision goes beyond the former holding and includes a case
where the statute was in effect prior to the time when the judge assumed
office. Moreover, the instant case, in its broader aspect, limits the scope
of the Sixteenth Amendment, an undesirable result, reached by regariing
the source of the items composing income rather than giving the ordinary
meaning to the all-inclusive -words "incomes from whatever source derived".
See Hubbard, The Sixteenth Amendment (1920) 33 HAXW. L. REv. 794.
CONsTITUTIoNAL LAw-INTERsTATE CO caxRxn AND STATE POLICE R nu.
LATIONS.-A statute required, under penalty of fine or imprisonment, that
no person should deliver a motion picture film for exhibition in Connecticut
without paying a tax of ten dollars for the first 1000 feet, and fifty cents
for each additional 100 feet in every reel. In a petition to restrain enforce-
ment of the act, the plaintiffs claimed that it was unconstitutional, as a
burden on interstate commerce. Held, that the petition be dismisced on the
grounds that the act was a police regulation validly imposed upon the ex-
hibition of motion pictures within the state. Fox Film Corporatiwz v.
Trumbull (1925, D. C. Conn.) Eq. 1805.
The business of exhibiting motion pictures is properly subject to police
regulation. State v. Loden (1912) 117 Md. 373, 83 Atl. 564. Such regu-
lation may include the assessment of inspection fees on all films to be ex-
hibited. Mutual Film Corporation V. I2Zdutrial Commksion of Ohio
(1915) 236 U. S. 230, 35 Sup. Ct. 387. And that some films to be ex-
hibited are shipped into the state seems immaterial. Mutual Film Corpora-
tion v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, supra. Or that they remain in
original packages of shipment. Sonneborn v. Cureton (1923) 262 U. S.
506, 43 Sup. Ct. 643; CoxmmENs (1924) 33 YALE LAw JounrAL, 321. But
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the statute questioned in the present case seems primarily to apply to the
delivery of films. Conn. Pub. Acts, 1925, ch. 177. And, it is submitted,
it ought not to have been construed by the court as a regulation of the
exhibition of pictures similar to the statute in the Mutual Film Corporation
case, supra. In this view the act may be considered to have a direct effect
upon interstate commerce and as a result, should be held invalid. A police
regulation must not hinder the delivery of goods into a state. Caldwoll v.
North Carolina (1902) 187 U. S. 622, 23 Sup. Ct. 229; see also Browning v.
Waycross (1914) 233 U. S. 16, 34 Sup. Ct. 578. This is true, a fortiori,
where the delivery from another state is in accordance with a previously
made contract, as in the present case. Leisy v. Hardin (1890) 135 U. S.
100, 10 Sup. Ct. 681; Norfolk etc. Ry. v. Sims (1903) 191 U. S. 441, 24 Sup.
Ct. 151; (1923) 37 HARV. L. REv. 157. But even in the view of the statute
taken by the court, the tax, which exceeds by more than five times similar
fees imposed in Florida, Kansas, Maryland, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania
and Virginia, might be held to go beyond the police power of the state. An
excessive inspection fee has been held invalid as a direct tax on interstate
commerce. Foote v. Maryland (1913) 232 U. S. 494, 34 Sup. Ct. 377;
Standard Oil Co. v. Graves (1918) 249 U. S. 389, 39 Sup. Ct. 320; (1921)
34 HARv. L. REy. 333. It might be necessary to show first, however, that
in actual operation the fees were unreasonable. Red C. Oil Co. v. North
Carolina (1912) 222 U. S. 380, 32 Sup. Ct. 152. If the present measure is
a burden on interstate commerce in either view suggested, the mere fact
that a similar burden is placed on domestic business cannot render it valid.
Robbins v. Shelby (1887) 120 U. S. 489, 7 Sup. Ct. 592; Minnesota v. Bar-
ber (1889) 136 U. S. 313, 10 Sup. Ct. 862. Nor would the fact that the
legislature may have intended it to operate only within the state. Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas (1909) 216 U. S. 1, 30 Sup. Ct. 190. Fol.
lowing this decision the distributors have taken what seems to be the
strongest position open to them by closing Connecticut exchanges and
shipping all films into the state via common carriers.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PoLICE POWER-PROPOSALS TO COMPEL ALL MOTOR
VEHICLE OWNERS TO PROVIDE SECURITY AGAINST PERSONAL INJURIES.-
Advisory opinions were asked by the legislatures of Massachusetts and
New Hampshire as to the validity of bills requiring all owners of motor
vehicles, as a prerequisite to their registration, to provide security against
possible personal injuries inflicted by their use. Held, that these statutes
would be valid under the police power. In re Opinion of the Justices
(1925, Mass.) 147 N. E. 681; In re Opinion of the Justices (1925, N. 11.)
129 At. 117.
With the increasing number of motor vehicles using the highways there
has .been a steady extension of laws for their regulation adopted in the
exercise of the "police power". Thus the legislature may exclude autos
from certain .highways. Commonwealth v. Kingsbury (1908) 199 Mass.
542, 85 N. E. 848; State v. Mayo (1909) 106 Me. 62, 75 Atl. 295. A
statute, making it criminal for an operator not to stop after an accident
and give information as to his identity and residence, has been held con-
stitutional. People v. Rosenheimer (1913) 209 N. Y. 115, 102 N. E. 530;
State v. Sterrin (1916) 78 N. H. 220, 98 Atl. 482. Likewise, a statute
which makes the operation of a motor vehicle within the state by a non.
resident equivalent to an appointment by him of a state official as his
attorney upon whom may be served notice of process has been unheld.
See COMMENTS (1925) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 415; Acts and Resolves of
Mass., 1923, 9h. 431, sec. 2; N. J. Pub. Laws, 1924, ch. 232, p. 517. And
laws requiring public service busses and taxicabs to insure or file security
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against possible future responsibility have been held constitutional. Wcit
v. City of Asbury ParL (1916) 89 N. J. L. 402, 99 Atl. 190; Pachard v.
Banton (1923) 264 U. S. 140, 44 Sup. Ct. 257; contra: People v. Kwstings
(1923) 307 Ill. 92, 138 N. E. 269 (because of discriminatory and unreason-
able rates). Apparently, from the reports of the instant cases, the~e
statutes would provide only against the financial irresponsibility of owners,
but they will not modify the rules of legal responsibility. It has been
suggested, however, that these should be changed so that the "transporta-
tion industry" would bear the loss incident to the use of highways in the
same way that industry through the Workaen's Compensation Acts pays
the costs of injuring workmen. Marx, The Curse of the Personal Injury
Suit and A Remedy (1924) 10 A. B. A. JOT& 493; Marx, Cornpulsory
Compensation Insurance (1925) 25 COL. L. REv. 164. It has been argued,
however, that not insurance, but a strict enforcement of traffic laws is
needed. Ives, Coipulsory Liability Insurance (1924) 10 A. B. A. Joun.
697.
LABOR UNIONS-RESTRAINT OF INTERSTATE Coamnc&-The plaintiffs,
whose business was interrupted and mines destroyed by union stri:ers,
sued the international, district, and local unions of miners under the
Federal Anti-Trust Act. The District Court directed a verdict for the
defendants, and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. Held,
that the judgment be affirmed as to the international union for want of
evidence showing participation, and reversed as to the others. Coronadq
Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America (1925, U. S.) 45 Sup. Ct. 551.
The first appeal attracted widespread attention because it was there de-
clared that a labor union could be sued. United Mine Workers v. Ccornado
Coal Co. (1922) 259 U. S. 344, 42 Sup. Ct. 570. See Sturges, Unincorporated
Associations as Parties to Actions (1924) 33 Y,= LAW JOURNL, 383;
COMMENTS (1922) 32 ibid. 59; NOTES (1923) 5 ILL. L. QtTArT. 126. The
present decision by reversing the judgment as to the local and district
unions affirms this position. The tests of acquiring jurisdiction under the
Federal Anti-Trust Act, heretofore announced, are also approved. The
restraint must have a "direct, material and substantial effect" upon inter-
state commerce. Chief Justice Taft in United Mine Workers v. Coronado
Coal Co., supra, at 411, 42 Sup. Ct. at 583. Within this rule interztate
commerce will be restrained (1) when physical volume actually in inter-
state distribution is interfered with; (2) where an intent to restrain
interstate distribution can be proved; (3) when evidence of this intent is
inferable from the volume of production obstructed. Gable -e. Vonnegut
Machinery Co. (1921, C. C. A. 6th) 274 Fed. 66; Danville Local Union v.
Danville Brick Co. (1922, C. C. A. 7th) 283 Fed. 909; United Leather Work-
ers v. Herkert (1924) 265 U. S. 457, 44 Sup. Ct. 623; Industrial Acsociation
v. United States (1925, U. S.) 45 Sup. Ct. 403. The instant decision departs
from the former in that statements of district leaders were held to be
sufficient evidence of an intent to restrain interstate commerce to be sub-
mitted to a jury. The court reaffirmed its finding that sufficient evidence
of an agency relationship existed between the leaders and the district and
local unions. But see COMMENTS (1922) 32 YALE LAW JouRNA,, 59, 61
(that "the ordinary rules of agency should apply and no insurer's liability
should be imposed".)
MASTER AND SERVANT-LABOR AS PAY WITHIN WORKIMEN'S COMPENSATION
ACT.-The plaintiff and the defendant, dairy farmers, agreed to assist each
other in filling their silos, reciprocal services to take the place of money
payments. The plaintiff, while working at the defendant's farm, crushel
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his arm in a cutter. He sued under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The trial court affirmed the commissioner's award in favor of the claimant,
on the ground that the relation of employer-employee existed between the
parties. The defendant appealed. Held, that the judgment be affirmed.
Smith v. Jones (1925, Conn.) 129 Atl. 50.
The one who has general control of a worker at the time of an accident
is an "employer" within the Workmen's Compensation Act. Aisenbory V.
Adams Co. (1920) 95 Conn. 419, 111 At]. 591; Tarr v. Holco Coal and
Coke Co. (1920) 265 Pa. 519, 109 Atl. 224. The worker, to recover under
the Act, must be hired for "pay." Conn. Gen. Sts. 1918, ch. 35, sec. .5388.
"Pay", although generally money, is not necessary confined to that form
of compensation. Cf. Roush v. Heffelbower (1923) 225 Mich. 664, 196 N. IV.
185; Halsted v. Allen (1903) 39 Tex. Civ. App. 324, 73 S. W. 1068
(land as pay); Marriner v. Roper Co. (1893) 112 N. C. 164, 16 S. l-. 906
(orders on company store); Hart v. Hudson (1896, Del.) 2 Marv. 283, 43
Atl. 172 (liquor and tobacco).
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONqS-PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLoYEES--MITIGA-
TION OF DAMAGS.-The defendant city discharged the relators, policemen,
on the ground that they were implicated in a robbery. A nolle prosequi
was entered as to each, and later they instituted mandamus proceedings for
reinstatement and for payment of salary during the period of wrongful
dismissal. The reinstatement was not objected to, but the defendant de-
nied the relators' right to salary, contending that they had earned money
by working elsewhere. Held, that peremptory writs for reinstatement and
payment of salary be issued. A rehearing was then granted. Hold, that in
accordance with a statute called to the attention of the court since the first
hearing, the writs were correctly issued, but the court indicated that the
same result could have been reached without the statute. Jardot v. City
of Rahway (1925, N. J. L.) 127 Atl. 799.
Upon breach of contract the promisee cannot recover damages which he
might reasonably have prevented. Harrington v. Empire Cream Separator
Co. (1921) 120 Me. 388, 115 Atl. 89; (1922) 31 YAIE LAw JoUnNAL, 441.
Where a public servant is involved, if he is termed an "employee" by the
court, the ordinary rules of mitigation of damages are applied. Sutliffe v.
City of New York (1909, 1st Dept.) 132 App. Div. 831, 117 N. Y. Supp. 813
(clerk in park dept.); cf. Jameson v. Board of Education (1916) 78 W. Va.
612, 89 S. E. 255 (school teacher). Where, however, he is termed an
"officer" these rules are not applied, and accordingly, an "officer" can
recover the full salary for the wrongful suspension period even when, as
in the instant case, he was at work elsewhere for pay. Andrews v. City of
Portland (1887) 79 Me. 484, 10 At]. 458 (city marshal); see Bullis v. City
of Chicago (1908) 235 Ill. 472, 479, 85 N. E. 614, 617 (policeman) ; contra:
City of Leadville v. Bishop (1900) 14 Colo. App. 517, 61 Pac.
58 (policeman). Most courts seem to distinguish between municipal "em-
ployees" and municipal "officers" without regard to the fact that the opera-
tive facts are often almost identical. An "employee" is said to hold his
position by virtue of a contract with the state. Baltimore v. Lyman (1901)
92 Md. 591, 48 At. 145 (school superintendent); Sutliffe v. City of New
York, supra. Whereas it is said that an "officer" is invested with a "portion
of the sovereign power" of the state and holds his position "as a trust from
the state". See Sibley v. State (1915) 89 Conn. 682, 685, 96 Atl. 161, 162
(sheriff) ; Farrell v. City of Bridgeport (1877) 45 Conn, 191, 195 (police-
man). And that his right to salary "is incident to the office, and not the
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creature of contract". See Chapwaa v. Waibrdgc (1899) 153 No. 191, 203,
54 S. W. 447, 449. By deciding these cases on the strength of labels rather
than on their merits, unfortunate results are sometimes reached. Thus
where the salary has been paid to a do facto officer serving during the
term of wrongful suspension, most courts do not allow the do jure officer
to recover anything from the government. Walters v. City of Padcah
(1909, Ky.) 123 S. W. 2S7. The only remedy available to the dc jure officer
in these cases is to collect from the dc facto officer. Krcitz v. Bcrcmi~mcycr
(1894) 149 Ill. 496, 36 N. E. 983. On the other hand, some courts allow
the de jure officer to recover from the state even though the salary has
already been paid to the de facto officer, thus forcing the state to pay tice
for the same service. Andrewvs v. City of Portland, s pra. It is submitteJ
that since the rule of mitigation of damages has proved valuable in com-
mercial relations, in the absence of statute it should be applied likewise in
all cases of municipal servants.
PIEADING-JOINDEP OF PARTIES--BRINGING IN DEFENDANTS WHO MLY
ULTDIATELY BE RESPONSIBLE-The plaintiff sued for the contract price of
certain finished goods which had been rejected for imperfections. Three
years after the action had been begun, he moved to bring in as additional
defendants under the N. Y. C. P. A. 1923, sec. 193, par. 2, the corporation
from which he bought the unfinished goods and the corporation which
finished them. From an order granting the motion, the additional defend-
ants appealed. Held, (one judge dissenti2g) that the order be reverzed,
as no common question of fact was involved. Stern v. Ide & Co. (1925, 1st
Dept) 212 App. Div. 714, 209 N. Y. Supp. 473.
The English courts, construing the provision on joinder of defendants
liberally with a view to simplifying practice and curtailing litigation, have
found a common question of fact in situations similar to that in the instant
case. Payne v. British Tbme Recorder Co. [1921, C. A.) 2 K. B. 1; Conge-
ladas v. Houlder Bros. & Co. [1910, C. A.] 2 K. B. 354; Bivllock v. Lqrdou
Gen'l Omnibus Co. [1907, C. A.] 1 K. B. 264. Sees. 192, 211, 212 of the
N. Y. C. P. A. on joinder were adopted from the English Judicature Act,
1890, Order XVI, rules 4, 5. The fact that the plaintiff did not join the
other defendants at the beginning of the action is of no significance since
the court may, on application of the plaintiff, order any person brought
in whom the plaintiff could have joined as defendant in the first instance.
Gittlenan v. Felitmazn (1908) 191 N. Y. 205, 83 N. E. 969; see M5ay Co. v.
Mott Ave. Corp. (1923, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 121 Misc. 393, 402, 201 N. Y.
Supp. 189, 192. The English decisions should have been persuasive as to
what constitutes a common question of fact, though the result may be
justified here since the plaintiff was guilty of laches.
PROCESS-JuRsSMICTION OVER NON-RESIDENTS IN PErsoNL AcTIONs.-
The plaintiff sued under N. J. Pub. Laws, 1924, ch. 232, which provides
that a non-resident by operating a motor vehicle in the state thereby
appoints the Secretary of State his agent to receive service of process in
any civil suit brought against him by a resident arising out of any accident
within the state in which such vehicle is involved. The defendant moved
to set aside the service, contending that the statute was unconstitutional.
Held, that the motion be denied. Martin v. Condon (1925, N. J.) 129
AtI. 738.
A statute requiring such appointment to be made by a duly executed
instrument has been held constitutional under the police power. Cleary -v.
Johnston (1909) 79 N. J. L. 49, 74 Atl. 538; Katie v. New Jcrocy (1916)
242 U. S. 160, 37 Sup. Ct. 30; (1917) 26 YAmm LAW JoumNAL, 422. On
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similar grounds, a Massachusetts statute, practically identical with that
involved in the instant case, has been upheld. Pawloski v. Hess (1924)
250 Mass. 22, 144 N. E. 760; (1925) 38 HARv. L. REv. 111. But it has been
suggested that the Massachusetts statute unwarrantedly extends the power
of the state, giving it jurisdiction over non-residents on an authority to
accept service not actually given. See NOTES (1925) 73 U. PA. L. REV. 171.
Nevertheless, these statutes seem to meet the requirement of due process
under the "reasonable notice" theory. See COMMENTS (1925) 34 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 415, 426. And in the light of the necessity for an expedient
means of acquiring jurisdiction over non-resident automobilists, such stat-
utes should be upheld. See NOTES (1925) 25 COL. L. REv. 204. A similar
statute has recently been enacted in Connecticut. Pub. Acts, 1925, ch.
122, sec.
REAL PROPERTY-MEANING OF TERM "OWNER" IN STATUTE.-An Illinois
statute provides for the organization of drainage districts, the property
affected to be assessed according to the benefit received therefrom. (Smith's
Ill. Rev. Sts. 1921, ch. 42.) Sec. 44 authorizes the abandonment of the entire
project upon petition of the owners constituting a majority in number and
acreage. Such a petition was filed in Logan County. Approximately
one-seventh of the land in this district was held under life-tenancies followed
by contingent remainders. The petition signed by the life tenants among
others, was dismissed by the lower court on the ground that the term
"owners" in the statute referred solely to owners in fee. Held, (one judge
dissenting) that the judgment be affirmed. Warren v. Salt Creek Drainage
District (1925) 316 Il1. 345, 147 N. E. 248.
The term "ownership" has no fixed meaning applicable to all situations,
and when used in a statute must be construed according to the purpose
thereof. In Re Fulham's Estate (1923) 96 Vt. 308, 119 Atl. 433; Sims v.
Fletcher Savings & Trust Co. (1924, Ind.) 142 N. E. 121. Thus, in con-
struing the term "owner" in various statutes, courts have even held that
the label applies to leasehold interests. Chiesa '. Des Moines (1912) 158
Iowa, 343, 138 N. W. 922 (tenant for years); Merrill Ry. & Lighting Co.
v. City of Merrill (1903) 119 Wis. 249, 96 N. W. 686 (lessee for five years);
Sims v. Fletcher Savings & Trust Co. supra (lessee for 99 years with
privilege of renewal). But cf. contra: People v. Bennett Medical College
(1911) 248 Ill. 608, 94 N. E. 110. Conversely, a chattel mortgagee, who
had become "owner" by default of the mortgagor, was held not to be the
owner within a liquor-seizure statute. State ex rel. Tenant Finance Corp.
v. Davis (1925) 111 Ohio, 569, 146 N. E. 82. Ordinarily an assessment
for a permanent improvement to real estate is prorated between the life
tenant and remainderman. Huston v. Tribbetts (1898) 171 Ill. 547, 49 N. E,
711; Troy v. Protestant Episcopal Church (1911) 174 Ala. 380, 56 So. 982.
Where, as here, however, the remainder is contingent, the life tenant, it
seems, must pay the full assessment. Furthermore, having the immediate
estate, he is necessarily the party most interested. In the instant case the
dissenting judge felt that life tenants should be deemed "owners" within
the meaning of this statute. The result reached by the majority of the
court was due to its defining the term rigidly, without giving sufficient
weight to the objects of the statute or the special circumstances of the
case. For a discussion of "ownership" see Cook, Introduction to Hlohfeld,
Fundamental Legal Conceptions (1923) 12.
SALEs-CoNvERSION-RESAIE BY VENDOR AFTER SUIT FOR PURCHASE
PRrcE.-The defendant vendor in a previous suit recovered judgment for
the purchase price of goods under N. Y. Cons. Laws, 1923, ch. 42, sec. 142
(1) ;-Uniform Sales Act, sec. 61 (1). While that action was pending, the
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defendant, relying on his vendor's lien, resold the goods. The buyer then
sued for conversion and his complaint was upheld. Held, (two judges
dissenting) that the judgment be reversed. D'Aprilc v. The Tuincr-Looker
Co. (1925) 239 N. Y. 427, 147 N. E. 15.
By refusing to sustain the buyer's suit for conversion the instant caze
results in allowing the vendor to recover the full purchase price in addi-
tion to the proceeds from a resale. Cf. Carolina Portland Cc2cnt Co. -e.
Columbia Improving Co. (1908) 3 Ga. App. 483, 60 S. E. 279; Pate v. Palo-
ton (1913) 158 Iowa, 411, 139 N. W. 906 (where re2covery for the bal-
ance only was allowed). The dissenting opinion takes the pozition that a
judgment for the full purchase price is inconsistent with a previouo resale
by the vendor. But it is submitted that this is not so since it is conceJel
in the majority opinion that the buyer may at any time receive credit for-
the resale. Thus there is no reason why the buyer by his refusal to receive
such credit should subject the vendor to an action for conversion. Cf.
(1925) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 106.
TAXATIoN-PUBLcITY OF INCOIE TAX RL-TURN.-The defendants, pub-
lishers, were indicted under Revenue Act of 1924, (43 Stat. at L. 25,
S44-346) (providing for public inspection of names, addresses and amounts
paid) for the publication of income taX returns. The lower court sustainel
a demurrer to the indictment. Held, that the judgment be affirmed. United
States v. Dickey (1925, U. S.) 45 Sup. Ct. 558.
The Federal statutes relating to the publication of income tau lists have
not been uniform. Act of 1894 (28 Stat. at L. 509, 557) (similar to the
present statute); Act of 1913 (38 Stat at L. 177) (allowing inspection
only on order of President, lists being open to state officers under certain
-conditions); Act of 1919 (40 Stat. at L. 106S) (in addition, permitting
stockholders access to the returns and providing for publication of names
and addresses); Act of 1924, supra. The instant ease involves only a
question of statutory construction, no question of the constitutionality of
the statute being raised. (1925) A. B. A. JOUR. 425. Wisconsin has taken
a view similar to that of the Federal Court. Juna u v. Wisconsin Tax
Commission (1924) 184 Wis. 485, 199 N. W. 63. The only ground which
appears to have been considered, on which the constitutionality of the act
might be questioned, is that it would constitute an invasion of the so-called
"right of privacy", but this appears to be untenable as it does not seem that
there is such a vested "right". Hubbard v. Mellon (1925, App. D. C.) 5
Fed. (2d) 764; see (1924) 19 ILL. L. REnv. 278. As a consequence, those
desiring a change of policy will have to address themselves to Congress.
TRADE-ML-KS AND UNFAIR COUPETITION-WHERE COIr4OnDITIES ARE NOT
IN Co0uPrzToN-LAcHEs.-Complainant for tventy years had used "Gold
Medal" as a trade-mark for pancake flour and buckwheat flour. Defend-
ant had used the name for over forty years as a trade-mark for wheat
flour, and had gained a nation-wide reputation for his product under this
name. In 1923 the defendant obtained registration of the trade-marl:
"Gold Medal" from the patent office for a pancake flour which it intended
putting on the market, having first submitted an affidavit that pancake
flour and wheat flour were different classes of commodities. Thereafter,
on application of the complaint, the patent office cancelled the defendant's
registration of this trade-mark. Defendant none the less proceeded to use
the name "Gold Medal" for its pancake and buckwheat flour. Complainant
filed a bill to enjoin defendant from so doing. The defendant made a
counter-motion to restrain the complainant's use of the trade-mark Held,
that plaintiff's motion for injunction be granted; counter-motion of the
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defendant denied. France Milling Co. v. Washburn-Crosby Co. (1925, S.
D. N. Y.) 3 Fed. (2d) 321.
The court based its decision squarely on the following grounds: first,
that "Gold Medal" is not an uncommon or distinctive name (the evidence
showed that "Gold Medal" is a registered trade-mark for 65 different
commodities) ; second, that pancake flour is separate and distinct from
wheat flour, and not in competition therewith; third, laches. In reasoning
as it did, the court seems to have failed to keep in mind that a trade-mark
is merely the visible manifestation of the more important business good
will, which is "property" to be protected against invasion. Weinstoekl W.
Marks (1895) 109 Calif. 529, 42 Pac. 142; Fox v. Glynn (1906) 191 Mass.
344, 78 N. E. 89; see Rogers, Comments on the Moderm Law of Unfair
Trade (1909) 3 ILL. L. REv. 551. For a trade-mark may become so asso-
ciated with a particular corporation that even though it is attached by
another to a different, distinct and not competing article, the public is apt
to believe that its original sponsor is responsible for the new venture. The
Collins Co. v. Oliver Ames & Sons Corp. (1882, C. C. S. D. N. Y.) 18 Fed.
561 (defendant was enjoined from manufacturing shovels under the trade-
mark "Collins & Co."--plaintiff made no shovels, but manufactured edge-
tools under this name); Florence.Mfg. Co. v. J. C. Dowd & Co. (1910, C.
C. A. 2d) 178 Fed. 73 (plaintiff manufactured toilet brushes-defendant
manufactured tooth brushes); Vogue Co. v. Thompsor.Hudson Co. (1924,
C. C. A. 6th) 300 Fed. 509 (defendant was enjoined from selling hats under
the trade-mark "Vogue"-plaintiff published a fashion magazine by that
name). Nor is fraud material except in the assessment of damages, for
the matter to be considered is the probable result of the defend-
ant's act, and not the purpose which may have induced it. Manitowoo
Co. v. Nurnsen (1899, C. C. A. 7th) 93 Fed. 196; Saxlehner v. Siegel Cooper
Co. (1900) 179 U. S. 42, 21 Sup. Ct. 16. This is a question of fact in each
case. Charles S. Higgins v. Higgins Soap Co. (1895) 144 N. Y. 462, 39
N. E. 490; Allegretti v. Allegretti Chocolate Cream Co. (1898) 177 Il. 129,
52 N. E. 487. Moreover, delay in bringing suit should not be a defense,
for the wrong is continuous. McLean v. Fleming (1877) 96 U. S. 245
(delay of 20 years); Menendez v. Holt (1888) 128 U. S. 514 (delay of 14
years). Delay in suing with knowledge may prevent recovery of damages
for past infringement, but does not affect the issuance of injunctive relief.
Singer Co. v. June (1895) 163 U. S. 169, 186 (delay of 7 years). The aim
should not be to see how little the defendant's business need be disturbed,
but how most effectively to protect the complainant's hard-earned good
will. Valentine v. Valentine (1900) 17 R. P. C. 686. In considering
the facts the court should be guided by the following test: will the
probable effect of the defendant's use of certain words, symbols, shapes,
colors, or containers be to mislead the unwary purchaser as to the source
of the goods? See Rogers, The Unwary Purchaser (1910) 8 MICH. L. REV.
623. It is believed that if the court in the instant case had utilized the
above rule, that it would have reached a contrary result.
USURY-LoAN on SALE .- Bauer seeing the possibility of a 200% profit
in a purchase of a tract of land, but lacking sufficient funds, persuaded
Maxwell to advance the money. Bauer purchased the land as an individual
for $175,000 and then conveyed to Maxwell. Maxwell immediately made
a contract to sell to the Bauer corporation for $225,000 payable in install-
ments, conveyance to be made upon completion of payment. The Bauer
corporation's affairs passed into the hands of a trustee in bankruptcy,
who claimed that the lawful rate of interest had already been paid in full
and sued to force Maxwell to convey. The lower court gave the relief
sought on the ground that the transaction was a usurious loan. Held,
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that the transaction was a sale and that the decree be reversed. Stark v.
Bauer Cooperage Co. (1925, C. C. A. 6th) 3 Fed. (2d) 214.
Rules of usury law justify their existence by protecting the borrower in
necessitous circumstances from extortion. Ford v. Hancock (1880) 36
Ark. 248; State v. Griffith (1910) 83 Conn. 1, 74 At. 10GS; Ryan, Usury
and Usury Laws (1st ed. 1925) 22; cf. Frorer v. People (1892) 141 Ill. 171,
13 N. W. 395. As a natural consequence whenever parties are in equal
economic positions there is a decided tendency to evade the letter of a usury
statute. Brush v. Peterson (1880) 64 Iowa, 243, 64 N. W. 289; LusT: v.
Smith (1905) 71 Kan. 550, 81 Pac. 173; Ryan, op. cit. 17. Where a vendor-
purchaser or mortgagor-mortgagee relationship exists such elements as
forfeiture provisions, title acting as security for the debt, and a duty to
pay may be common to both and some courts are inclined to disregard form
and look to the real nature of the transaction. Washinigton Fire 17w. Co.
v. Maple Valley Lumber Co. (1914) 77 Wash. 686, 138 Pac. 553; Ringcr v.
Virgin Timber Co. (1914, E. D. Ark.) 213 Fed. 1001. Thus since usury
statutes are construed as not applicable to sales, wherever the parties are
on equal economic footing courts tend to call the transaction a "sale."
Edwards v. Capps (1905) 122 Ga. 827, 50 S. E. 943; Briggs -v. Steel (1909)
91 Ark. 458, 121 S. W. 754. But in situations similar except for the neces-
sitous circumstances of the debtor, the transactions have been called usuri-
ous loans. Tomlin v. Morris (1904) 26 Ky. 681, 82 S. W. 373; Banh.- v.
Walter (1910) 95 Ark. 501, 130 S. W. 519; Rinh gcr v. Virgin Ti'mbcr Co.,
supra. And in the somewhat analogous situation of a contract for the
sale of land where the vendee is in possession and time of payment is
made expressly of the essence, courts may hold the transaction similar to
a mortgage and allow an "equity of purchase" though the vendee is in
default. Parkin '. Thorold (1852, Ch.) 16 Beav. 59; Mullins v. Big Creel:
Co. (1895, Tenn. Ch.) 35 S. W. 439; contra: Hcckard v. Sayre (1874)
34 Ill. 142. In short, courts tend to look squarely at the real nature of
the transaction. Washington Fire Ins. Co. v. Maple Valley Lumbcr Co.,
supra; Schautz v. Sotscheck (1914, 1st Dept) 160 App. Div. 793, 145
N. Y. Supp. 778. The instant case is another illustration of applying
usury only for the "prevention of traffic in the misfortunes of others".
WILLs--ADEPTIoN op LEGACY-DESTRUCTION OF SUBJECr M%-Lxr-A
testatrix bequeathed "one string of my pearls" to one legatee, and "the
second string of my pearls" to another. The two strings were held to-
gether with a clasp and graded in the usual manner, the one that was
slightly smaller lying inside the other. Prior to the death of the testa-
trix the pearls had been combined into one string. The lower court dis-
missed the petition of one of the legatees for distribution of the legacy.
Held, that the order of dismissal be reversed, the two legatees to become
owners of the pearls as tenants in common. Ewyn v. Dc Garmcndid
(1925, Md.) 128 Atl. 913.
A destruction or substantial change in the subject matter of a specific
legacy works an ademption. Unitarian Society v. Tufts (1890) 151 Mass.
76, 23 N. E. 1006; Wheeler v. Wood (1895) 104 Mich. 414. 62 N. W. 577.
An intent to adeem is not necessary. Ash burer v. McGuire (1786, Ch.)
2 Bro. C. C. 108; contra: Beall v. Blake (1854) 16 Ga. 119; -ee NOT3
(1924) 24 COL. L. REv. 405, 408. But if the change is merely one of form,
there is no ademption. Ford v. Ford (1851) 23 N. H. 212 (release of one
of two obligors on a note); Anthony v. Smith, E-'r (1853) 45 N. C. 188
(renewal of bond); Skipwith. v. CabciIs Ex'r (1870, Va.) 19 Grat. '753
(substitution of state bonds for corporate bonds guaranteed by state);
Pope v. Hinckley (1911) 209 Blass. 323, 95 N. E. 798 (stock of defunct
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corporation represented by voting certificates issued for new corporation);
In re Frahm's Estate (1903) 120 Iowa, 85, 94 N. W. 444 (agreement to
accept bonds for stock) ; Fidelity Title and Trust Co. v. Young (1924) 101
Conn. 359, 125 At. 871 (new stock certificates of different par value).
A bequest of stock of a parent company, however, does not include shares
in a subsidiary company. In re Brann (1916) 219 N. Y. 263, 114 N. E.
404. It would seem, however, that too great a change in the res was al-
lowed where a legatee of stock in one company was held to take stock of
the company into which it, with other companies, had been consolidated.
In re Peirce (1903) 25 R. I. 34, 54 Atl. 588; Goode v. Reynolds (1925, Ky.)
271 S. W. 600. The instant case construes the words of gift to describe
pearls iather than two strings of pearls; and the distribution of the pearls
to the two legatees as tenants in common, although not in strict compliance
with the terms of the two bequests, seems a desirable result,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AcT-CONFLICT OF LAWS-INJUnY IN Fon-
EIGN STATE.-The plaintiff's husband was employed by the defendant com-
pany under a contract made in Connecticut contemplating work to be done
solely in Massachusetts. The defendant company carried compensation
insurance on its employee in Massachusetts. In the course of this employ-
ment the ihusband was killed, and the plaintiff brought suit under the Con-
necticut Workmen's Compensation Act. From an award that the plain-
tiff recover under that Act, the defendant appealed. Held, that the award
be sustained. Pettiti v. T. J. Pardy Const. Co. (1925, Conn.) 130 Atl, 70.
While under the so-called "contract" theory of Workmen's Compensation
law the natural tendency has been to apply the lex loci contractus, the
elastic test of the "implied intent" of the parties has allowed room for the
application of the lex loci injuriae. Cf. Rounsaville v.,Central R. R. (1915)
87 N. J. L. 371, 94 AtL. 392; American Radiator Co. v. Rogge (1914) 86 N.
J. L. 436, 92 At. 85, 94 At]. 85. The result has apparently been that each
court almost invariably applies its local law. See COMMENTS (1920) 30
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 71, 72. Such has been the effect, to a limited degree,
in Connecticut. Dowthwright v. Champlin (1917) 91 Conn. 524, 100 Atl.
97 (lex loci injuriae applied when the locus contractus had no Compensation
Act); Banks -v. Howlett Co. (1918) 92 Conn. 368, 102 Atl. 822; (1918) 27
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 707 (lex loci injuriae applied when contract made in
foreign state was to be performed entirely in Connecticut). In New York
a consequence may be the allowing of duplicate litigation. Anderson v,
Jarrett Chambers Co. (1924, 3d Dept.) 210 App. Div. 543, 206 N. Y. Supp.
458. But such holding seems hardly warranted in its departure from the
common law rule of res adjudicata. See (1925) 10 CORN. L. QUART. 364,
366; cf. Putnam v. Clark (1881) 34 N. J. Eq. 532. It has been guarded
against by express provisions in Compensation Acts. Logan v. Missouri
Valley Bridge & Iron Co. (1923) 157 Ark. 528, 249 S. W. 21. And it is
to be presumed that the present plaintiff, bringing a second action in
Massachusetts, would be denied recovery. The court in the instant case
expressly overrules Banks v. Howlett Co., supra. Query whether the next
step will be to overrule Dowthwright v. Champlin, supra. Cf. COMMENTS
(1917) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 113; Bradbury, Workmen's Compensation
(2d ed. 1914) 56, 57. Unless the implied intention theory is to be carried
to extremes, it would appear that either the court has turned toward a
uniform application of the lex loci contractus or is in reality reasoning from
a quasi-contractual (obligation imposed by law) theory of interpretation
of the statute. The latter, it is submitted, is the more probable explanation.
And on such a theory the Banks and the Dowthwright cases are not neces-
sarily inconsistent with the present decision.
